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INTRODUCTION 
In his 1974 Nobel Prize Lecture, Freidrich Hayek admonished 
us, as he did throughout so much of his work, about the limitations of 
our knowledge and stressed what knowledge we do have should be 
used “not to shape the results as the craftsman shapes his handiwork, 
but rather to cultivate a growth by providing the appropriate 
environment.”1 This analogy—what Hayek referred to as the “pretense 
 
 *  Galen J. Roush Professor of Law and Director, Spangenberg Center of Law, Technology 
& the Arts, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. My thanks to Sean Seymore and 
the Vanderbilt Law Review. 
 1. Friedrich von Hayek, Prize Lecture: The Pretence of Knowledge (Dec. 11 1974), 
www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1974/hayek-lecture.html 
[https://perma.cc/9SXS-P9RH]. The full quote is:  
If man is not to do more harm than good in his efforts to improve the social order, he 
will have to learn that in this, as in all other fields where essential complexity of an 
organized kind prevails, he cannot acquire the full knowledge which would make 
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of knowledge”—is germane to legal systems where the common law 
plays a prominent role. Patent law is such a field.2 
Judicial stewardship of the patent space can be seen as an 
institutional advantage, one that compares favorably to punctuated, 
and potentially more distortive or inartful, congressional action.3 The 
judge is closer to the “inside baseball” dynamic that is unique to each 
of the divergent interests that participate in the patent system.4 Each 
 
mastery of the events possible. He will therefore have to use what knowledge he can 
achieve, not to shape the results as the craftsman shapes his handiwork, but rather to 
cultivate a growth by providing the appropriate environment, in the manner in which 
the gardener does this for his plants. 
Id. Of course, the limitations of knowledge of a centralized source was a theme in much of 
Hayek’s work. See, e.g., Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, in INDIVIDUALISM 
AND ECONOMIC ORDER 77, 77–78 (1949) (stating “[t]he peculiar character of the problem of a 
rational economic order is determined precisely by the fact that the knowledge of the 
circumstances of which we must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated form but 
solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the 
separate individuals possess”); Andrew P. Morriss & Susan E. Dudley, Defining What to 
Regulate: Silica and the Problem of Regulatory Categorizations, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 269, 281 
(2006) (“Hayek's central point was that decentralized markets focus dispersed information—
information that no one individual . . . can obtain—and convey it efficiently to market 
participants.”). 
 2.  See Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 
51, 101 (2010) (discussing the dominance of the common law in the development of patent 
doctrine and policy); see also Donald S. Chisum, Reforming Patent Law Reform, 4 J. MARSHALL 
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 336, 348 (2005) (“In the 215 year history of the United States patent 
system, Congress has rarely purported to ‘reform’ the system. Indeed, I am not sure that it has 
ever done so since the 1836 Act—or even since the 1793 Act.”); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and 
Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1041 
(2003) (“[T]he history of the patent statute as well as its language strongly suggest that Congress 
has delegated policymaking responsibility in patent law to the judiciary.”); cf. Kimble v. Marvel 
Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2413 (2015) (“By contrast with the Sherman Act, the patent laws 
do not turn over exceptional law-shaping authority to the courts.”). See generally INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2015) (examining what the 
common law can contribute to the field of intellectual property). 
 3.  For example, reflecting on Congress’s inability to pass substantive patent legislation for 
several years, Senator Arlen Specter stated that some members of the Judiciary Committee in 
2008 “spent a lot of time [on the damages language] trying to find the magic words and [ ] didn’t 
find them.” Patent Reform in the 111th Congress: Legislation and Recent Court Decisions: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 3 (2009) (statement of Sen. Specter). 
 4.  See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 312 (2003) (“Many highly progressive, research-intensive 
industries, notably including the computer software industry, do not rely heavily on patents as a 
method of preventing free riding on inventive activity.”); Richard C. Levin, Alvin K. Klevorick, 
Richard R. Nelson & S.G. Winter, Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and 
Development, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783 (1987); Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. 
Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and 
Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 7552, 2004) (finding different industries rely on different appropriability mechanisms to 
varying degrees; for instance, a majority of the industries surveyed noted that they rely on more 
than one “appropriability mechanism” as part of their “appropriability strategy” (e.g., a 
combination of lead time and trade secrets or patents and lead time)); cf. ECON. & STAT. ADMIN. 
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interest has its own norms and customs, each is impacted by the 
patent system in varying ways and to varying degrees, and the 
common law, although imperfect,5 is more likely to develop doctrine 
that reflects the combined legitimate expectations of all interests. 
Indeed, the common law “projects its roots more deeply and intimately 
into human interaction than does statutory law.”6 
In addition, the common law allows for a certain flexibility, or a 
“resistance to systematization,” as Eben Moglen noted.7 Despite its 
deep allegiance to tradition, crust forms more readily on statutory law 
than the common law. And one of the tools that reflects this 
institutional litheness is the use of legal fictions, which have been 
employed by judges in various areas of the law seemingly since the 
beginning of the common law process—even back to Roman law.8 A 
fiction serves a variety of purposes, but its principal use is to allow the 
judge to construct rules and to reach holdings that perhaps, without 
the veil of fiction, would not be as feasible within the existing confines 
of stare decisis or the formalism associated with well-worn doctrine.9 
 
& U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: INDUSTRY IN 
FOCUS 7–8 (2012) (identifying several industries as “patent intensive” based on the ratio of 
number of patents to industry-specific jobs; industries included computer and communications 
equipment, semiconductor, navigational, measuring, and electromedical). 
 5.  See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383 (1908). 
Judicial power in the patent system has not always been exercised in the most judicious manner. 
The 1940s witnessed an anti-patent bias on the Supreme Court, and today, the same drivers that 
motivated Congress to repeatedly visit the patent code have spilled over to the high court and 
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, who over the past several years have used their common law 
powers to “correct” what is perceived to be an overly pro-patent environment. 
 6.  Lon L. Fuller, Human Interaction and the Law, 14 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 26 (1969). A more 
lighthearted way to think about the common law is to view it in the context of the comparative 
approaches of English and French landscaping. As Andreas Kluth wrote, the French approach is 
“mastery of nature . . . is a top-down notion of order,” whereas “the English way is to integrate 
the human into nature, to adjust to the spontaneous or ‘bottom-up’ order of nature itself.” 
Andreas Kluth, French & Anglo-Saxon Ways of Thinking, HANNIBAL AND ME: LIFE LESSONS IN 
HISTORY (Apr. 25, 2010), http://andreaskluth.org/2010/04/25/french-anglo-saxon-ways-of-
thinking/ [https://perma.cc/5K6L-HZ77] (emphasis omitted). 
 7.  Eben Moglen, Legal Fictions and Common Law Legal Theory: Some Historical 
Reflections, 10 TEL AVIV U. STUD. L. 33, 33 (1990). 
 8.  See Nancy J. Knauer, Legal Fictions and Juristic Truth, 23 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1, 2 
(2010) (noting under Roman law the “praetor would endorse a false procedural statement, known 
as a fictio, in order to extend a right of action beyond its intended scope”). Common examples of 
legal fictions include treating as invitees trespassing children who were subsequently injured. 
Certainly the children were not invited, but courts needed a mechanism to create a higher 
standard of care for children. Another example is ignorance of the law is not a defense, thus 
presuming the public has complete and perfect knowledge of its legal obligations. But not having 
this fiction, as Justice Holmes notes, “would be to encourage ignorance where the lawmaker has 
determined to make men know and obey . . . .” OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 
48 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1881). 
 9.  See Jones v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions [1962] AC 635, 711 (“The principle of [stare 
decisis] does not apply only to good decisions: if it did, it would have neither value nor 
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Legal fictions can be useful devices to bridge evidentiary gaps, further 
normative preferences, and fill in epistemic interstices that, despite 
the aforementioned advantages of the judge, pervade the common law. 
In this regard, fictions “are the product of the law’s struggles with new 
problems,”10 and, while paying respect to the anchor of history, they 
reflect the dynamic, fluid nature of law, allowing for circumspect 
experimentation and a Burkean gradualism to change.11 In a more 
colloquial sense, fictions buy time to allow for the proposed change in 
the law to play out in a purposeful way through the common law 
process. Whereas Roscoe Pound viewed fiction as “a clumsy device 
appropriate only [when] . . . legislation on any large scale is not 
possible,” it is for this very reason that the use of fiction is a desirable 
tool, one that can keep the encroaching legislator at bay, while 
allowing for testing of new waters.12 (The multiyear effort leading up 
to the America Invents Act (“AIA”) is a good example of concerns 
associated with legislative responses.13 But fiction is not a device that 
 
meaning.”); Maksymilian Del Mar, Legal Fictions and Legal Change in the Common Law 
Tradition, in LEGAL FICTIONS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 244 (Maksymilian Del Mar & William 
Twining eds., 2015):  
Legal change occurs through filling in gaps between rules in the way that seems most 
convenient or most just at the time; through twisting existing rules, or rediscovering 
old ones, to give the impression that a change in the law is no more than the 
application of the law that was already in place . . . . 
For a general discussion of the history of the common law and its modern application, see Gerald 
J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part I), 2 OXFORD U. COMMONWEALTH L.J. 
155 (2002); and Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part II), 3 OXFORD U. 
COMMONWEALTH L.J. 1 (2003). 
 10.  LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 94 (1967); see also id. at 21–22 (“[F]ictions . . . [are] 
the growing pains of the language of the law.”). Knauer notes, “These patently false statements 
and deeming principles empower lawyers and decision-makers to resolve novel legal questions 
through arguments of equivalence and creative analogical reasoning.” Knauer, supra note 8, at 3. 
 11.  This is something Sir Henry Maine explicitly recognized more than 150 years ago. SIR 
HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 21–43 (1861) (asserting that fictions, equity, and 
legislation are the three means by which the law changes, although Maine was dubious about 
the desirability of legal fictions, particularly because of transparency concerns).  
 12.  Del Mar, supra note 9, at 241 (quoting ROSCOE POUND, 3 JURISPRUDENCE 465 (1959)). 
As Del Mar notes, “That pragmatic incrementalism is the spirit of change in the common law is 
itself widely recognised in the theoretical as well as the historical literature.” Id. at 244. 
 13.  For five years prior to the enactment of the America Invents Act of 2011 (“AIA”), 
Congress unsuccessfully sought to reform the patent statute. See Patent Reform Act of 2009, 
S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009); Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. (2009); Patent 
Reform Act of 2008, S. 3600, 110th Cong. (2008); Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th 
Cong. (as amended by Senate, Jan. 24, 2008); Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. 
(as amended by House, Sept. 7, 2007); Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. (2006); 
Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005); see also Nard, supra note 2, at 102–03 
(discussing the role the courts played in modifying the patent law while Congress debated 
legislation). The failure to enact reform legislation has largely been blamed on the divergent 
views of the pharmaceutical industry on the one hand, and the information technology and 
financial services industry on the other hand. See DAN L. BURK AND MARK A. LEMLEY, THE 
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gives the jurist license to freelance; rather, in skilled hands, fictions 
can serve as powerful tools to effect change through incrementalism.14 
At first blush, it may seem odd that legal fictions would find a 
comfortable home in patent law, given that patent jurisprudence is so 
closely related to technological fields steeped in empirical certainty. 
But this should come as no surprise; as Lon Fuller wrote, there is 
“scarcely a field of the law in which one does not encounter” legal 
fictions.15 Beyond the doctrinal arcana and scientific principles, from a 
greater remove, patent law is like any other area of the law where the 
judge plays a prominent role. Yet what is interesting about patent law 
is its relationship with information, particularly how it seeks to 
regulate exclusivity of and access to technical information. Legal 
fictions in patent law express themselves in this context, taking the 
familiar forms of presumptions, deemings, and other “techniques”16 to 
either express preferences relating to administrability of patentability 
requirements such as novelty and the public use doctrine, two of the 
public domain’s gatekeepers,17 or mask normative choices pertaining 
to claim scope that play out along the ex ante/ex post incentive 
continuum. With respect to the former, patent law treats information 
in a manner that serves a protective function that shields the public 
domain by erecting presumptively omniscient sentries around the 
domain’s perimeter. Regarding the latter, information is employed to 
further a disseminative function, which not only enriches the global 
storehouse of technical knowledge but also limits claim scope through 
the doctrines of commensurability and prosecution history estoppel 
(“PHE”). This Article explores how legal fictions are constructed to 
bolster these functions. 
 
PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 101 (2009) (discussing this dynamic); see 
also supra note 3. 
 14.  In this sense, the common law’s use of legal fictions seeks to avoid the pitfalls of a 
comparatively ill-informed legislative response, despite Bentham’s strident criticisms of the legal 
fictions as an invasive threat to the legislature’s domain. See JEREMY BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON 
THE COMMENTARIES AND A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 509 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 
1977). As Samek writes, “The misuse of fictions is not a prerogative of the judiciary, but also 
taints legislation at its root. Is there a greater fiction than the pretense of the legislator that he 
can cure all mischiefs by an act of Parliament?” R.A. Samek, Fictions and the Law, 31 U. 
TORONTO L. J. 290, 298 (1981). 
 15.  FULLER, supra note 10, at 1.  
 16.  Moglen, supra note 7, at 36–38. 
 17.  Non-obviousness can, well, obviously be added to this category, but that is a topic for 
another day. 
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I. DEFINING LEGAL FICTION 
Legal fictions were a common topic for legal scholars and 
philosophers from the mid-eighteenth century to the first third of the 
twentieth century. Scholars have long recognized the pervasiveness 
and functionality of legal fictions. Lon Fuller, perhaps the most well-
known writer in this space, noted that “the influence of the fiction 
extends to every department of the jurist’s activities,”18 and 
Blackstone appreciated them as “highly beneficial and useful.”19 
Pierre de Tourtoulon viewed fictions as integral to the progress of law, 
writing, “[I]f one would try to strip the Law of every fiction of the past 
as well as of the present, not much would be left.”20 But early opinions 
on legal fictions in the law varied. While applauding their utility, 
Blackstone did not appreciate using the legal fiction as a method to 
get to the correct result,21 and the founder of utilitarianism, Jeremy 
Bentham, famously disdained legal fictions,22 writing that they 
 
 18.  Lon L. Fuller, Legal Fictions, 25 ILL. L. REV. 363, 363 (1930). 
 19.  3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *43. Blackstone discussed a number of legal 
fictions in his Commentaries. For example, common recovery was based on a legal fiction that 
was recognized as having the utility of allowing a landowner to transfer fee simple interest in his 
law. This was designed to get around England’s de donis conditionalibus statute, which vested 
only a fee tail in landowners in order to prevent a man from divesting his heirs of the right to 
inherent his land. The common recovery action operated a suit against a fictitious person in 
order to award land title. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *357–60. Blackstone 
understood the utility of certain legal fictions. For example, he described a legal fiction used to 
support jurisdiction before the King’s Bench or Queen’s Bench as “startl[ing]” yet “highly 
beneficial and useful.” 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *43 (“And these fictions of law, 
though at first they may startle the student, he will find upon further consideration to be highly 
beneficial and useful . . . .”). 
 20.  PIERRE DE TOURTOULON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW 388 (Martha 
McC. Read trans., 1922). 
 21.  In discussing the legal fictions necessary in common recovery actions, Blackstone 
opined that “while we applaud the end, we cannot but admire the means” of such fictions. 2 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *360. 
 22.  1 JEREMY BENTHAM, A Fragment on Government; or a Comment on the Commentaries, 
in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 221, 235 (John Bowring ed., 1962). In his critique of 
Blackstone’s Commentaries, Bentham condemns Blackstone’s disdain for legislative attempts to 
make the law accessible to citizens without legal training. Bentham’s principal argument is that 
the legislature did not do enough because legal fictions remain in the law. For more on 
Bentham’s as well as Vaihiger’s view of legal fiction, see Samek, supra note 14, at 292–304. 
 Bentham was hardly alone in his dislike of fictions, the principal criticisms being grounded 
in lack of transparency and candor, as well as an intrusion on the legislative function. See 
PIERRE J.J. OLIVIER, LEGAL FICTIONS IN PRACTICE AND LEGAL SCIENCE 151 (1975): 
Whenever a judge finds it necessary to create a new fiction, it indicates that the major 
premise he is applying is wrong . . . [and] [a]s far as the adoption by judges of 
historical fictions is concerned, the judge is obliged to adopt the rule forming part of 
the common law, but should reject its fictional form or fictional basis; 
3 ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 465 (1959) (referring to fiction as “a clumsy device appropriate 
only to periods of growth in a partially developed political organization of society in which 
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“poison the sense of every instrument [they] come near” with their 
“pestilential breath.”23 
Familiar legal doctrines grounded in legal fictions include the 
common criminal law maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse. 
This maxim is based on the legal fiction that all persons know the 
law.24 The attractive nuisance doctrine asserts the fiction that a 
property owner is considered to have invited a child onto his property, 
even if he is unaware of the child’s presence.25 Corporate personhood 
is another well-worn fiction, which has actually been codified.26 Yet 
another is the presumption that a man intends to cause the natural 
and probable consequences of his acts.27 Modern legal fictions, or what 
Peter Smith identifies as “new” fictions,28 include limiting instructions 
for jurors (e.g., disregard inadmissible evidence) and the reliability of 
eyewitness testimony.29 
Traditionally, there were two reasons to employ legal fictions: 
(1) “[t]o cure deficiencies in the law of procedure”; and (2) “[t]o conceal 
the fact that judges, by their decisions, are making or changing the 
substantive law.”30 Under the second reason, legal fictions allow 
judges to enlarge or to alter the law while maintaining the appearance 
that the law is left intact.31 Such legal fictions are recognized as 
“either (1) a statement propounded with a complete or partial 
 
legislation on any large scale is not possible”); Jeremiah Smith, Surviving Fictions, 27 YALE L.J. 
147, 153 (1917) (stating fictions “retard the framing of a statement of the rule in strictly accurate 
terms”). 
 23.  BENTHAM, supra note 22, at 235. 
 24.  Jeremiah Smith, Surviving Fictions II, 27 YALE L.J. 317, 317 (1918). 
 25.  Fuller, supra note 18, at 372. 
 26.  See, e.g., 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, 
unless the context indicates otherwise . . . the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations, 
companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as 
individuals . . . .”). Beyond 1 U.S.C. § 1, courts have found Congress’s use of the word “person” 
includes more than only natural people. For example, in interpreting who qualifies as a foreign 
state for immunities purposes, the Seventh Circuit stated:  
[I]f it was a natural person Congress intended to refer to, it is hard to see why the 
phrase “separate legal person” would be used, having as it does the ring of the 
familiar legal concept that corporations are persons, which are subject to suit. Given 
that the phrase “corporate or otherwise” follows on the heels of “separate legal 
person,” we are convinced that the latter phrase refers to a legal fiction—a business 
entity which is a legal person. 
Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 881 (7th Cir. 2005). But at least one early scholar argued 
that corporate personhood is not a legal fiction as evidenced by the original definition of “person.” 
Fuller, supra note 18, at 377. 
 27.  Smith, supra note 22, at 156. 
 28.  Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1437 (2007). 
 29.  Id. at 1452–55. 
 30.  Smith, supra note 22, at 147. 
 31.  Id. at 150. 
        
1524 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:6:1517 
consciousness of its falsity, or (2) a false statement recognized as 
having utility.”32 
Another view is provided by Maksymilian Del Mar, who views 
legal fictions as vehicles to impose normative consequences by 
suspending an operative fact either “because (1) the absence of proof of 
some required fact; or (2) the presence of proof to the contrary.”33 Del 
Mar distinguishes legal fictions from presumptions, asserting that the 
latter “take a stance on the likelihood of an operative fact being 
present.”34 But Moglen identifies the use of presumptions as 
“techniques” of fiction35 that serve as “device[s] by which the 
counterfactual is declared.”36 In this regard, presumptions and other 
techniques such as “deeming”37 are fiction-implementing tools that set 
the stage for common law experimentation and, ultimately, 
rulemaking. As Del Mar writes, fictions are “instrument[s] via which, 
incrementally, the law gropes its way towards a principle.”38 
  This incremental approach reveals why fictions are a useful tool 
in the common law process. Fictions provide a means of 
experimentation, a doctrinal trial balloon that may or may not lead to 
a more established principle of law. Thus, employing fiction and its 
techniques allows for a circumspect approach to change, one that is 
not too disruptive yet conspicuous enough to rattle the cages of 
formalism.39 As Allan Hutchinson wrote, the key question for the 
common law process is, “How is it possible to balance stability and 
continuity against flexibility and change such that it results in a state 
 
 32.  Fuller, supra note 18, at 369. 
 33.  Del Mar, supra note 9, at 226. Fuller notes that while fictions concede a falsehood, “a 
presumption assumes something that may possibly be true.” FULLER, supra note 10, at 40; see 
also Raymundo Gama, Presumptions and Fictions: A Collingwoodian Approach, in LEGAL 
FICTIONS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 347, 348–58 (Maksymilian Del Mar & William Twining eds., 
2015) (distinguishing between fiction and presumption). 
 34.  Del Mar, supra note 9, at 226. 
 35.  Moglen, supra note 7, at 37. 
 36.  Id. at 36. 
 37.  Moglen also cites “assertion” and “deeming” as additional techniques. Id. at 36, 38. 
 38.  Del Mar, supra note 9, at 235; see also Peter Birks, Fictions Ancient and Modern, in 
THE LEGAL MIND: ESSAYS FOR TONY HONORÉ 83–101 (Neil MacCormick & Peter Birks eds., 1986) 
(describing an approach to “fictionalisation” which recognizes the ambiguous character of 
situations that have the same normative consequences). 
 39.  As Pound wrote, legal fictions are “the solvent of formalism.” POUND, supra note 22, at 
461. Several areas of the law have reportedly benefited from experimentation. See, e.g., Mark C. 
Weber, Complex Litigation and the State Courts: Constitutional and Practical Advantages of the 
State Forum Over the Federal Forum in Mass Tort Cases, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 215, 229 
(1994) (“Tort law is a field in which the experimentation has been particularly fruitful.”). For a 
justification of legal fiction from the perspective of pragmatism, see Douglas Lind, The Pragmatic 
Value of Legal Fictions, in LEGAL FICTIONS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 83 (Maksymilian Del Mar 
& William Twining eds., 2015). 
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of affairs that is neither only a case of stunted development nor a case 
of ‘anything goes’?”40 
II. LEGAL FICTION AND PATENT LAW’S APPROACH TO INFORMATION 
Patent law’s relationship with information is complex and 
nuanced. Operating underneath the well-known narrative that patent 
law is designed to incentivize inventors to cajole Mother Nature to 
reveal her secrets for the benefit of society is a modulated incentive-
based dynamic that seeks to promote invention while also guarding 
the public domain. In this regard, patent law’s treatment of 
information, which is at the heart of this dynamic, serves two 
functions: (1) protective and (2) disseminative. The former function 
relates to protecting the public domain by demanding the claimed 
invention be both novel and not in public use for a prolonged period of 
time.41 The latter function both enriches the global storehouse of 
technical knowledge and, by deploying the doctrines of 
commensurability and PHE, fuels improvement activity by limiting 
claim scope. 
The policies driving and underlying these doctrines are 
supported, in large part, by the construction and use of legal fictions. 
Indeed, legal fiction is the scaffolding upon which these requirements 
are built, assuming the form of hypothetical artisans, legal 
presumptions,42 and deemings as a means to address institutional 
ignorance, bridge evidentiary gaps, and further normative 
preferences. What follows is a discussion of these functions, beginning 
with the protective function. 
A. The Protective Function: Guarding the Public Domain 
1. Novelty 
Prior to the AIA, § 102(a) of the patent code stated a “person is 
entitled to patent unless the invention was known or used by others in 
this country.”43 This statutory section embodies patent law’s novelty 
 
 40.  ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, EVOLUTION AND THE COMMON LAW 10 (2005). 
41 Of course, other patentability requirements such as non-obviousness and eligibility are 
consistent with the protective function, but for reasons set forth below, novelty and public use 
strike me as particularly good examples of legal fiction at play in patent law. 
 42.  For more on the use of presumptions in patent law, see Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents, 
Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 IND. L.J. 779, 808–25 (2011). 
 43.  35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012)). Section 102 was 
amended by the AIA, effective March 16, 2013. Therefore, the pre-AIA § 102 will remain relevant 
and applicable to all patent applications filed before this date. The AIA did away with the 
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requirement, one of the most basic, and arguably intuitive, 
requirements for patentability. The first Patent Statute, enacted in 
1790,44 required that the invention not be “known or used.”45 These 
words have been interpreted—although not consistently—in a manner 
that can be characterized as an aggressive posture toward protecting 
the public domain. Patent law’s reverence for the public domain is 
pronounced, and the public domain is protected by a legal fiction—
namely, a hypothetical person46 having ordinary skill in the art 
(“PHOSITA”) who is presumed or deemed to possess near complete 
and perfect knowledge of the prior art.47 As the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit notes, “The person of ordinary skill is 
a hypothetical person who is presumed to be aware of all the pertinent 
prior art.”48 
 
“known or used” language and replaced it with “a person shall be entitled to a patent unless the 
claimed invention was . . . otherwise known to the public.” There has been no case law on this 
statutory provision as of this writing. 
 44.  Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109 stated, in relevant part: 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of 
America in Congress assembled, That upon the petition of any person or persons to 
the Secretary of State, the Secretary for the department of war, and the Attorney 
General of the United States, setting forth, that he, she, or they, hath or have 
invented or discovered any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any 
improvement therein not before known or used, and praying that a patent may be 
granted therefor . . . . 
(Emphasis added). 
 45.  These words had statutory staying power for over 220 years. In 2011, Congress 
amended the novelty provision of the patent code to read: “A person shall be entitled to a patent 
unless—(1) the claimed invention was . . . otherwise available to the public . . . .” The words 
“known or used” no longer appear in § 102, but it remains unclear if the judicial interpretation of 
“known or used” will serve as precedent for the new statutory language. 
 46.  See In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (referring to the PHOSITA as a 
“legal construct . . . akin to the ‘reasonable person’ used as a reference in negligence 
determinations. The legal construct also presumes that all prior art references in the field of the 
invention are available to this hypothetical skilled artisan.”).  
 47.  See Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 
(“It should be clear that that hypothetical person is not the inventor, but an imaginary being 
possessing ‘ordinary skill in the art’ created by Congress to provide a standard of 
patentability . . . .”); Cont’l Can Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 415 F.2d 601, 603 (3d Cir. 1969) 
(stating a person of ordinary skill in the art is “chargeable with comprehensive knowledge of” the 
prior art). In the non-obviousness context, the presumption of knowledge is cabined to “analogous 
art.” The underlying policy is that once the universe of prior art moves beyond information that 
directly reads on the invention, it becomes more difficult for inventors searching to fully 
appreciate the full scope of the prior art. The analogous arts doctrine eases the burden and more 
accurately reflects reality. See In re Wood, 599 F.2d 1032, 1036 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (“[W]e attempt to 
more closely approximate the reality of the circumstances surrounding the making of an 
invention by only presuming knowledge by the inventor of prior art in the field of his endeavor 
and in analogous arts.”).  
 48.  Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 
1986); see Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Realistic Approach to the Obviousness of 
Inventions, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 989, 991–92, 1017 (2008) (arguing that the focus should be 
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While our fictitious artisan is omniscient,49 the knowledge and 
use of which he is presumed to be aware must be “publicly accessible.” 
That is, the language “known or used” has a publicity requirement, 
because patent law purportedly does not permit private knowledge to 
defeat patent rights.50 Herein resides our second fiction relating to the 
novelty requirement—namely, publicity really means an absence of 
secrecy. This fiction is best illustrated by the facts and holdings in 
Rosaire v. Baroid Sales Division51 and Gayler v. Wilder.52 
In Rosaire, Rosaire and Horvitz held patents on methods of 
prospecting for oil or other hydrocarbons. Horvitz assigned his patent 
rights to Rosaire, who in turn sued Baroid for patent infringement of 
the method patents. Baroid claimed that the Rosaire patents were 
invalid because the claimed methods were “carried on by one Teplitz 
for the Gulf Oil Corporation” before Rosaire’s 1936 date of invention. 
Rosaire conceded that Teplitz’s work “was done before Rosaire 
and Horvitz conceived of the [patented] inventions” but asserted that 
neither Teplitz nor Gulf gave the “public the benefit of” their work. In 
other words, the public did not know of Teplitz’s prior invention 
because, after some experimentation, Gulf discontinued work on the 
project. Implicit in this argument is that it was Rosaire and Horvitz, 
not Teplitz and Gulf, who benefited the public in a manner consistent 
with the utilitarian policy objectives of patent law. Accordingly, 
argued Rosaire, Teplitz’s work, while prior in time, should not be 
considered invalidating prior art. The court was not persuaded: 
 
on what the PHOSITA actually knows instead of what he or she “might believe in a hypothetical, 
counterfactual world”); see also Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 454 (Fed. 
Cir. 1985) (noting the hypothetical artisan is “presumed to be aware of all the pertinent prior 
art”). For reasons why PHOSITA is created, see Jonathan J. Darrow, The Neglected Dimension of 
Patent Law’s PHOSITA Standard, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH, 227, 235 (2009) (“Although unrealistic, 
this presumption helps to avoid difficult issues of proof related to the inventor’s actual 
knowledge and prevents obvious variations of publicly disclosed inventions from being captured 
through subsequent patent grants.”). 
 49.  See In re Nalbandian, 661 F.2d 1214, 1216 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (identifying the PHOSITA 
as a “fictitious person”). 
 50.  See Minn. Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Chemque, Inc., 303 F.3d 1294, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“For 
prior art to anticipate under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) because it is ‘known,’ the knowledge must 
be publicly accessible . . . . For prior art to anticipate because it has been ‘used,’ the use must 
be accessible to the public.”); Woodland Tr. v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1370 
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[T]o invalidate a patent based on prior knowledge or use, that knowledge or 
use must have been available to the public.”). This interpretation preceded the 1952 Patent Act. 
35 U.S.C. § 102(a) reviser's note (1952) (noting that “ ‘known’ has been held to mean ‘publicly 
known’ ” and that “no change in the language is made at this time”); P.J. Federico, Commentary 
on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1954), reprinted in 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 
161, 178 (1993) (“ ‘[I]nterpretation [of § 102(a)] by the courts excludes various kinds of private 
knowledge not known to the public,’ and the narrowing interpretations are not changed.”). 
 51.  218 F.2d 72 (5th Cir. 1955). 
 52.  51 U.S. (10 How.) 477 (1851). 
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With respect to the argument advanced by [Rosaire] that the lack of publication of 
Teplitz’s work deprived an alleged infringer of the defense of prior use, we find no case 
which constrains us to hold that where such work was done openly and in the ordinary 
course of the activities of the employer, a large producing company in the oil industry, 
the statute is to be so modified by construction as to require some affirmative act to 
bring the work to the attention of the public at large.53 
The court acknowledged this position is seemingly inconsistent with 
patent law’s policy of “enrich[ing] the art and the encourage[ment] of 
disclosure,” but nonetheless pointed out there is no requirement to 
make knowledge public before such knowledge can be deemed prior 
art. 
The patentee fared better in Gayler v. Wilder, but only because 
of a faulty memory. The inventor, Fitzgerald, developed and secured a 
patent on a fireproof safe. During litigation, it was asserted that 
Connor invented a similar safe several years before Fitzgerald’s 
invention date. Nonetheless, the Court treated Fitzgerald as the “first 
and true” inventor because Connor’s safe “had passed away from the 
memory of Connor . . . and those who had seen it.”54 The Court placed 
a great deal of emphasis on the public benefit resulting from 
Fitzgerald’s disclosure; it is Fitzgerald “that brings it to [the public]” 
wrote the Court.55 Contrary to the patented methods in Rosaire, the 
fireproof safe invention—prior to Fitzgerald’s independent efforts—
was “completely lost as if it had never been discovered.”56 Nonetheless, 
from a prior art knowledge and accessibility perspective, the Court 
explicitly noted if Connor’s “safe and its mode of construction were 
still in the memory of Connor,” Fitzgerald’s patent would be 
invalidated.57 This would be true even if Connor abandoned the safe 
and did not “try the value of his safe by proper tests” or “bring it to 
public use.”58 
The legal fiction of presumptive knowledge in both cases works 
to further two policy objectives: protecting the public domain and 
administrability. With respect to the former, the Court assumed a 
purist, arguably overly aggressive,59 approach to novelty. But, one can 
ask, is serving this approach inconsistent with other policy 
 
 53.  Rosaire, 218 F.2d at 74–75. 
 54.  Gayler, 51 U.S. (10 How.) at 498. 
 55.  Id. at 497.  
 56.  Id.  
 57.  Id. at 498.  
 58. Id.  
59 See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 143 (2011) (stating 
that novelty rules relating to protecting the public domain “are so solicitous of preserving access 
to the prior art that they can seem almost absurd. There is no inquiry into the practical 
accessibility of the prior art; once it is public, even marginally, and only in one obscure place or 
one obscure form, the game is over — no patent. Period.”)  
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objectives—namely, a technical disclosure that inventors such as 
Rosaire, Horvitz, and Fitzgerald confer on the public? Comparatively, 
these three individuals have contributed more to the public storehouse 
of knowledge, which may lead to improvement activity. From a 
practical standpoint, the work of Teplitz and Connor (assuming 
Connor remembered his safe) was inaccessible to anyone other than 
Teplitz and Connor. In this regard, the public is defined very 
narrowly. The second policy consideration, the ease and efficiency of 
administration, is arguably more persuasive. If Teplitz and Connor 
are not the “public,” then who is? How many people need to have 
access to the claimed invention before novelty’s publicity requirement 
is triggered? A reasonable number of people? 
2. Public Use 
The public use doctrine precludes an inventor from obtaining a 
patent if his claimed invention was in public use more than one year 
prior to his filing a patent application.60 This doctrine forms part of 
the statutory bar framework of patent law, which operates 
independently from the novelty provisions, and thus attaches and can 
defeat patent rights even if an inventor satisfies the novelty 
requirement. 
The idea than an inventor (or third party) can engage in 
activity that defeats his patent rights dates back to the late eighteenth 
century.61 In the historically significant case of Pennock v. Dialogue,62 
Justice Story provided a rationale for public use and other statutory 
bars. Justice Story expressed a consequentialist view of the patent 
system, one designed primarily to promote the public good. This goal 
could be furthered by disclosing to the public innovations “at as early 
 
 60.  35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). The AIA retained the “public use” doctrine in § 102(a)(1), 
which states: “A person shall be entitled to a patent unless the claimed invention was . . . in 
public use . . . before the effective filing date . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012). Section 102(b)(1) 
sets forth “exceptions” to this rule, the most important of which is the grace period of one year 
that existed in the pre-AIA § 102. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1) (2012). For example, an inventor who 
publicly uses his invention before the effective filing date may still obtain a patent in the United 
States if the inventor files for a patent within one year from the public use event. Id. It is 
generally understood, although not certain, that the pre-AIA interpretation of “public use” will 
carry over to the new statute. See Safeco Ins. Co. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 48 (2007) (“[A] common 
law term in a statute comes with a common law meaning, absent anything pointing another 
way.”); see also Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 101 (2011) (“[W]here Congress uses 
a common law term in a statute, we assume the ‘term . . . comes with a common law meaning, 
absent anything pointing another way.’ ”). 
 61.  Under § 1 of the Patent Act of 1793, an inventor was entitled to a patent if, among 
other things, his invention was not in use before the date of application. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 
11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 318–19.  
 62.  27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1 (1829). 
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a period as possible; having a due regard to the rights of the 
inventor.”63 With this premise, Justice Story stressed that an inventor 
should not be “permitted to hold back from the knowledge of the public 
the secrets of his invention” while also commercially exploiting his 
invention.64 Promoting early disclosure, preventing the removal of 
inventions from the public that the public has justifiably come to 
expect are freely available, and preventing the inventor from 
commercially exploiting the exclusivity of his invention beyond the 
statutory term are policies underlying statutory bars. 
The key interpretive question is what Congress meant by 
“public.” In the famous nineteenth-century case of Egbert v. 
Lippmann,65 the Supreme Court assumed a minimalist approach to 
“public.” In this case, Barnes’s close friend (and future wife), Francis, 
complained that her corset-steels would frequently break. In 1855, 
Barnes took it upon himself to make a pair of steels that were more 
durable, and presented them to her to try. Francis wore the steels, and 
other pairs made by Barnes, for several years. Barnes applied for a 
patent in 1866, eleven years after Francis first wore the steels made 
by Barnes. The question before the Court was whether Francis’s 
wearing of the corset-steels (under a garment) for several years 
constituted a “public use,” and thereby barred Barnes from obtaining 
patent protection. The Court answered in the affirmative. 
According to the Court, “to constitute the public use of an 
invention it is not necessary that more than one of the patented 
articles should be publicly used.”66 Moreover, “whether the use of an 
invention is public or private does not necessarily depend upon the 
number of persons to whom its use is known.”67 Indeed, if an inventor 
gives or sells his invention to another for use, without the expectation 
of confidentiality, “and it is so used, such use is public, even though 
the use and knowledge of the use may be confined to one person.”68 In 
 
 63.  Id. at 19. 
 64.  Id. at 2. Justice Story continued: 
[I]f he should for a long period of years retain the monopoly, and make, and sell his 
invention publicly, and thus gather the whole profits of it, relying upon his superior 
skill and knowledge of the structure; and then, and then only, when the danger of 
competition should force him to secure the exclusive right, he should be allowed to 
take out a patent, and thus exclude the public from any farther use than what should 
be derived under it during his fourteen years; it would materially retard the progress 
of science and the useful arts, and give a premium to those who should be least 
prompt to communicate their discoveries.  
Id. at 19. 
 65.  104 U.S. 333 (1881). 
 66.  Id. at 336. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. 
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other words, Francis is the “public.” But it is odd to think of one 
person as the “public”; the word public denotes the broader community 
or certainly several people. As the dissent in Egbert wrote, 
If the little steel spring inserted in a single pair of corsets, and used by only one woman, 
covered by her outer-clothing, and in a position always withheld from public 
observation, is a public use of that piece of steel, I am at a loss to know the line between 
a private and a public use.69 
The rule of Egbert that one person other than the inventor is 
the “public” can be characterized as a deeming. This principle has a 
stipulative quality and is perhaps somewhat arbitrary. One can argue, 
as the dissent did, that the public must include more than Francis, but 
this leads us into a more pronounced arbitrariness. How many people 
beyond one person before we move from private to public? Five people? 
Ten? A reasonable amount of people? Here we see that the technique 
of deeming, a form of legal fiction, resides in its ease of 
administrability and enhanced certainty. 
B. Disseminative Function: Keeping Claim Scope on a Leash 
The disseminative function is traditionally viewed as serving to 
enrich the storehouse of technical knowledge to be used by competitors 
and others to improve upon the claimed invention. This function is the 
domain of the enablement requirement. But the disseminative 
function also has a complementary, yet restrictive, role to play, one 
that limits claim scope and provides running room for competitors. 
Enablement plays an important part here, too, through the 
commensurability principle and the doctrine of prosecution history 
estoppel (“PHE”). Legal fiction plays an integral role in both 
commensurability and PHE, supporting the cabining force these 
principles have on the patentee’s claim scope. 
1. Enablement as Ignition and Constraint 
Lecturing to his economics class in 1948, almost twenty years 
after the publication of his monumental work A History of Mechanical 
Inventions, Abbott Payson Usher remarked that the “inventor lives in 
the company of a great company of men, both dead and living.”70 
Usher was referring to the debt current innovators owe to those who 
came prior in time, those who shared with their successors triumphs, 
failures, and mundanities. The cumulative and simultaneous nature 
 
 69.  Id. at 339. 
 70.  See Arthur P. Molella, The Longue Durée of Abbott Payson Usher, 46 TECH. & CULTURE 
779, 789 (2005) (quoting from lecture notes taken by one of Usher’s students in 1948). 
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of invention is well documented, and the patent doctrine that best 
exemplifies this collective enterprise is enablement. 
The enablement doctrine facilitates information dissemination. 
Technical information disclosed in the patent has potential immediate 
value to follow-on researchers interested in improving the patented 
invention or to the public by contributing to the general storehouse of 
technical knowledge.71 In the realm of intangible assets, the written 
word is the predominant disseminative device. This view of 
enablement was embraced by the House of Lords in Kirin-Amgen, Inc. 
v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd., wherein Lord Hoffmann wrote: 
[D]isclosure is not only to enable other people to perform the invention after the patent 
has expired. If that were all, the inventor might as well be allowed to keep it secret 
during the life of the patent. It is also to enable anyone to make immediate use of the 
information for any purpose which does not infringe the claims. The specifications of 
valid and subsisting patents are an important source of information for further 
research, as is abundantly shown by a reading of the sources cited in the specification 
for the patent in suit.72 
Enablement also has a restrictive role that functions to keep 
claim scope on a leash by requiring the inventor’s disclosure to enable 
subject matter commensurate with the scope of the claims. In other 
words, to satisfy the principle of commensurability, claim scope must 
be less than or equal to the scope of the enablement, which means that 
the disclosure must enable a person having ordinary skill in the art to 
make and use the claimed invention without “undue 
experimentation.”73 A patentee cannot claim more than he discloses. 
On the one hand, commensurability is a straightforward 
application of patent law’s quid pro quo. It simply asks whether the 
inventor has taught (disclosed) what he seeks to claim, but by focusing 
solely on the relationship between the disclosure and the claim, 
commensurability purposely assumes a parochial approach to 
teaching. It ignores the spurring aspects of the disclosure vis-à-vis 
competitors. It may be that while commensurability tethers the claims 
to the patent’s disclosure, the written description of the invention may 
 
71. For more on the teaching and disseminative function of patent law’s disclosure 
requirements, including noteworthy critiques, see Sean B. Seymore, Making Patents Useful, 98 
MINN. L. REV. 1046 (2014); Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 621 (2010). 
 72.  Kirin-Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd. [2004] UKHL 46, [2005] 1 All ER 
667 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.). On the importance of access to and dissemination of 
information for technological innovation, see WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE FREE-MARKET 
INNOVATION MACHINE: ANALYZING THE GROWTH MIRACLE OF CAPITALISM 73–92 (2002); and JOEL 
MOKYR, THE GIFTS OF ATHENA: HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 28–77 (2002). 
For a discussion on the gradual nature of innovation, see GEORGE BASALLA, THE EVOLUTION OF 
TECHNOLOGY (1988).  
 73.  See In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 733 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
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also trigger an improvement or modification in a competitor’s mind, 
one that commensurability seeks to keep out of the reach of the 
inventor. 
This is not to suggest that commensurability is a misguided 
principle, but only to note that implicit in the doctrine is a 
presumption that the inventor has not enriched the art to the point 
where a property right should obtain, even though the inventor may 
have engaged in self-induced competition thereby empowering 
competitors.74 Why make this implicit presumption? The legal fiction 
serves three goals. First, similar to our discussion of novelty and 
public use, it furthers an ease of administration. It is less difficult to 
discern claim scope by matching the text of the disclosure with that of 
the claims without having to engage in a thought experiment relating 
to other doors the inventor may have opened for improvers and 
competitors. Second, the implicit presumption (the fiction) paves the 
way for a moral determination: an inventor should not be given a 
property right on that which he did not invent. Period. From this 
perspective, it is of little moment that the inventor unlocked a 
technical feature or insight that heretofore has eluded the improver. 
And third, commensurability allows for enough space for follow-on 
improvers to build upon the claimed invention without fear of 
infringement. 
All three of these considerations were on display in the well-
known case of O’Reilly v. Morse.75 Samuel Morse’s patent related to 
telegraphy. The patent had eight claims, the first seven of which were 
uncontroversial, describing the instruments of operation of the 
telegraph as well as the famous Code. But claim eight was of a 
different character: 
I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery, or parts of machinery, 
described in the foregoing specification and [previous seven] claims; the essence of my 
invention being the use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic current, which I 
call electromagnetism, however developed, for making or printing intelligible 
characters, letters, or signs, at any distances, being a new application of that power, of 
which I claim to be the first inventor or discoverer.76 
 
74. This may help explain the common practice in licensing transactions for the licensee to 
request (demand) an “enabling package,” which includes access to the inventor, know-how, and 
other forms of tacit knowledge not included in the specification. This practice is consistent with 
what Jeanne Fromer found regarding the sufficiency of patent disclosures generally. According 
to Fromer, “Notwithstanding the primacy of the patent document as a publicly available 
repository of information about a patented invention, a good deal of evidence suggests that 
technologists do not find that it contains pertinent information for their research.” Jeanne C. 
Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 560 (2009).  
 75.  56 U.S. (1 How.) 62 (1854). 
 76.  Id. at 62. 
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The majority, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Roger 
Taney, invalidated Morse’s claim eight as overbroad, based on Morse’s 
failure to comply with the commensurability requirement.77 For the 
majority, Morse sought to claim “an exclusive right to use a manner 
and process which he has not described and indeed had not 
invented.”78 This short statement reflects both the administrability 
and moral points. This doctrinal application of commensurability also 
promoted the policy of providing follow-on improvers with room to 
maneuver or freedom to operate. As Justice Taney wrote, 
If this claim [claim 8] can be maintained, it matters not by what process or machinery 
the result is accomplished. For aught that we now know some future inventor, in the 
onward march of science, may discover a mode of writing or printing at a distance by 
means of the electric or galvanic current, without using any part of the process or 
combination set forth in the [Morse’s] specification [claims 1-7]. His invention may be 
less complicated—less expensive in construction, and in its operation. But yet if it is 
covered by this patent the inventor could not use it, nor the public have the benefit of it 
without permission from this patentee.79 
Claims one through seven and the description of the subject 
matter of these claims did satisfy the commensurability requirement 
but were of narrower scope. Claim eight reflected Morse’s ambition 
and his self-awareness that claims one through seven merely 
scratched the surface of telegraphy. Morse wanted broader protection 
against the inevitable competition. And he found a supporter in 
Justice Grier, who wrote the dissent. Justice Grier did not directly 
address Justice Taney’s reliance on commensurability, as that would 
be unavailing. Rather, Justice Grier focused on Morse’s “most 
wonderful and astonishing invention,” one that required “tenfold more 
ingenuity and patient experience to perfect it, than the art of printing 
with types and press.”80 For Justice Grier, Morse had delivered 
something significant to the public, while others such as Steinheil, 
Cook, Wheatstone, and Davy did not. It is this contribution on which 
the Court should have based its decision, in addition to the words of 
the patent. Focusing exclusively on the text of the patent would be an 
invitation for imitators and others less worthy than Morse. According 
to Justice Grier, 
If it be the use of the words “however developed” that the claims is to be adjudged too 
broad, then it follows that a person using any other process for the purpose of developing 
 
 77.  Regarding claims 1 through 7, Chief Justice Taney wrote, “We perceive no well-founded 
objection to the description which is given of the whole invention and its separate parts, nor to 
his right to a patent for the first seven inventions set forth in the specification of the claims. The 
difficulty arises on the eighth.” Id. at 112. 
 78.  Id. at 113.  
 79.  Id.  
80.  Id. at 134 (Grier, J., concurring). 
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the agent or element of electro-magnetism, than the common one now in use, and 
described in the patent, may pirate the whole art patented.81 
Justice Grier saw an artificiality—a fiction—in the 
commensurability requirement, one that neglects the facts on the 
ground: the contribution that Morse made to society. Rather than 
battle Justice Taney on doctrine, Justice Grier adduced his own moral 
argument of just deserts. The problem for Justice Grier was that 
Justice Taney would argue Morse did indeed get what he deserved. 
The Morse case also highlights a broader policy issue in patent 
law: the determination of optimal claim scope—a very difficult 
endeavor. An important part of this determination—namely, where 
the patentee’s claim scope resides on the narrow–broad continuum—
relates to how much improvement activity patentees such as Morse 
should be able to capture vis-à-vis follow-on improvers. Justice Taney 
and Justice Grier provide competing perspectives on optimal claim 
scope. Justice Taney’s approach provides follow-on improvers with 
more freedom to operate (emphasis on ex post incentives), whereas 
Justice Grier places more emphasis on ex ante incentives. The 
economist Suzanne Scotchmer captures this balancing act: 
When innovation is cumulative, the most important benefit of the innovation may be the 
boost it gives to later innovators. The boost can take at least three forms. If the next 
innovation could not be invented without the first, then the social value of the first 
innovation includes at least part of the incremental social value provided by the second. 
If the first innovation merely reduces the cost of achieving the second, then the cost 
reduction is part of the social value provided by the first. And if the first innovation 
accelerates development of the second, then the social value includes the value of 
getting the second innovation sooner. The problem introduced for incentive mechanisms 
is how to make sure that earlier innovators are compensated for their contributions, 
while ensuring that later innovators also have an incentive to invest.82 
These considerations are not exclusive to patent law. As Judge 
Easterbrook wrote in a copyright case, during the creative enterprise 
every author is simultaneously both a “creator in part and a borrower 
in part.” In this context, “[b]efore the first work is published, broad 
protection of intellectual property seems best; after it is published, 
narrow protection seems best.”83 Nonetheless, “only one rule can be in 
force” and “[t]his single rule must achieve as much as possible of these 
inconsistent demands.”84 Easterbrook candidly acknowledged how 
 
81.   Id. at 135 (Grier, J., concurring). 
 82.  SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 127 (2004) (emphasis added). See 
also Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. (1 How.) 322, 329 (1858) (“Whilst the remuneration of genius and 
useful ingenuity is a duty incumbent upon the public, the rights and welfare of the community 
must be fairly dealt with and effectually guarded.”). 
 83.  Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1541 (7th Cir. 1990). 
84.   Id. 
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difficult it is to address this challenge from an institutional 
perspective, as “[n]either Congress nor the courts has the information 
that would allow it to determine which is best. Both institutions must 
muddle through, using not a fixed rule but a sense of the consequences 
of moving dramatically in either direction.”85 
Patent law employs the legal fictions embodied in the 
commensurability requirement to wrap some certainty around the ex 
ante/ex post claim scope determination. Commensurability does not 
give credit to a patentee whose disclosure may have spurred 
improvement activity. Rather, by focusing on the claim-specification 
correspondence, commensurability introduces a more administrable 
test for claim scope, embraces a moral dimension of just deserts, and 
furthers the policy choice of providing improvers with room to operate. 
2. Prosecution History Estoppel and Cabining Claim Scope 
The doctrine of equivalents (“DOE”) dates to the mid-
nineteenth century.86 The doctrine holds that an accused infringer, 
while not literally infringing the claimed invention, may nonetheless 
be liable for infringement if the accused product performs 
substantially the same function in substantially the same way to 
achieve substantially the same result; in other words, if there are 
insubstantial differences between the invention as claimed and the 
accused product. 
The driving force behind the DOE is the inherent limitation of 
language.87 For example, in Graver Tank v. Linde Air Products,88 
Justice Jackson evoked powerful imagery, noting that a world without 
the DOE would give rise to the “unscrupulous copyist”89 and turn the 
 
 85.  Id. Consistent with this theme, William Robinson, the prominent nineteenth-century 
patent law treatise author, wrote in 1890 that “[w]ith very few exceptions, every invention is the 
result of the inventive genius of the age, working under the demand of its immediate wants, 
rather than the product of the individual mind.” WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS 
FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 29 (1890). See generally Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of 
Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989 (1997). 
86.  See Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 336 (1853) (holding that a patent may 
be infringed by a product that operates upon the same principle first suggested by the patentee 
even if it differs in form from the patentee’s invention). This doctrine finds expression in other 
jurisdictions. For example, the Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 of the European 
Patent Convention states, “For the purpose of determining the extent of protection conferred by a 
European patent, due account shall be taken of any element which is equivalent to an element 
specified in the claims.” European Patent Convention, Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 
69, art. 2, Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 348. 
87.  See infra notes 102–103. 
 88.  Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950). 
 89.  Id. at 607. 
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patent into a “hollow and useless thing.”90 While the doctrine was 
firmly embedded in the patent law landscape, it remained susceptible 
to criticism. Perhaps the most conspicuous weakness of the DOE is its 
tolerance of uncertainty. Once you move beyond the literal scope of the 
patent claim, certainty gives way to equity, making it more difficult 
for a competitor to discern whether he infringes. As the dissent in 
Graver Tank wrote, the patent claim is not “a nose of wax.”91 
By the mid-1990s the Federal Circuit began to rethink its DOE 
jurisprudence, trending away from Justice Jackson’s florid language 
in Graver Tank. The “unscrupulous copyist” was less of a concern than 
the importance of certainty and notice in a property rights regime, and 
the incentives associated with claim drafting and litigation practices 
created by uncertainty. The courts turned to the doctrine of PHE as a 
tool to limit application of the DOE. 
Beginning with Warner-Jenkinson,92 the Federal Circuit, in a 
fractured manner, began to rein in the DOE, taking it head on. The 
Supreme Court picked up on the Federal Circuit’s view of the DOE 
and cast the doctrine as one that needed to be checked lest uncertainty 
run amok. The Court created a rebuttable presumption, a common 
legal fiction, to address the following situation: What happens when a 
patent applicant amends his claim during prosecution but fails to give 
a reason for the amendment? Is the DOE still available in this 
situation? The Court created a rebuttable presumption that PHE 
applies, thus barring application of the DOE. According to the Court, 
“When the patentee is unable to explain the reason for amendment, 
estoppel not only applies but also ‘bar[s] the application of the doctrine 
of equivalents as to that element.’ ”93 Yet in the eyes of some Federal 
Circuit judges, the Court did not go far enough. 
 
 90.  Id.; see also Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 
(2002): 
The language in the patent claims may not capture every nuance of the invention or 
describe with complete precision the range of its novelty. If patents were always 
interpreted by their literal terms, their value would be greatly diminished. The scope 
of a patent is not limited to its literal terms but instead embraces all equivalents to 
the claims described. 
 91.  339 U.S. at 614 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 92.  Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
 93.  Id. at 33. The Court went on to explain,  
The presumption we have described, one subject to rebuttal if an appropriate reason 
for a required amendment is established, gives proper deference to the role of claims 
in defining an invention and providing public notice, and to the primacy of the PTO in 
ensuring that the claims allowed cover only subject matter that is properly patentable 
in a proffered patent application.  
Id. at 33–34. 
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On the horizon was Festo,94 which offered the Federal Circuit 
another crack at the DOE’s expansiveness. Armed with the technique 
of presumption, the Federal Circuit enunciated its infamous (and 
short-lived) complete bar. That is, when a patent applicant narrows 
his claim during prosecution, he is completely barred from invoking 
the DOE during litigation. As the frontal assault to the DOE failed in 
Warner-Jenkinson, this rule was seen as a backdoor attempt to rid 
patent law of the DOE. But it soon became apparent that this 
aggressive use of fiction was too disruptive, particularly viewed 
through the lens of the conservative common law. Once again the 
Supreme Court intervened, no doubt sensing the Federal Circuit had 
gone too far. In a nuanced and candid opinion, the Court replaced the 
complete bar with yet another rebuttable presumption. 
The Festo presumption holds that when an applicant, by 
amendment, narrows his patent claims for reasons related to 
patentability, it “may be presumed to be a general disclaimer of the 
territory between the original claim and the amended claim.”95 This 
presumption may be rebutted by showing that the equivalent the 
patentee seeks to capture was unforeseeable at the time of the 
 
 94.  Festo, 535 U.S. 722. 
 95.  Id. at 740. The Festo presumption is invoked once it is determined there was a 
narrowing amendment made for reasons related to patentability. The presumption limits 
application of the DOE to technologies that were unforeseeable at the time of the amendment, 
so-called after-arising technologies. But can the DOE apply to foreseeable technologies in the 
absence of a narrowing amendment? This was the issue in Ring & Pinion Service, Inc. v. ARB 
Corp., 743 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The accused infringer, Ring & Pinion (“R&P”), agreed 
that its accused product literally met all but one of the limitations of the claimed invention. 
Id. at 833. And R&P further agreed that the remaining element of its product was an 
equivalent. Id. But R&P asserted the DOE does not apply because the equivalent element was 
foreseeable at the time the patent application was filed. Id. at 834. Thus, the single legal issue 
for the court was “whether an equivalent is barred under the doctrine of equivalents because it 
was foreseeable at the time of the patent application.” Id. at 833. The court held that 
foreseeability was not a limitation to applying the DOE: 
There is not, nor has there ever been, a foreseeability limitation on the application of 
the doctrine of equivalents. It has long been clear that known interchangeability 
weighs in favor of finding infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Warner-
Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 36, 117 S. Ct. 1040, 137 
L.Ed.2d 146 (1997) (“The known interchangeability of substitutes for an element of a 
patent is one of the express objective factors . . . bearing upon whether the accused 
device is substantially the same as the patented invention.”); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. 
v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609, 70 S.Ct. 854, 94 L.Ed. 1097 (1950) (holding 
that “whether persons reasonably skilled in the art would have known of the 
interchangeability of an ingredient not contained in the patent with one that was” is 
an “important factor” weighing in favor of equivalence) . . . . Excluding equivalents 
that were foreseeable at the time of patenting would directly conflict with these 
holdings that “known interchangeability” supports infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents. We conclude that the foreseeability of an equivalent at the time of 
patenting is not a bar to a finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. 
Id. at 834. 
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amendment.96 A failure to rebut the presumption precludes 
availability of the DOE. 
Foreseeability is a concept lawyers are comfortable with, and it 
gives patentees an opportunity to access the DOE. Thus, the 
rebuttable presumption employed by the Court is a more nuanced 
approach than the Federal Circuit’s complete bar. As such, “This 
presumption is not, then, just the complete bar by another name.”97 
Rather, it reflects the informational asymmetry of patent prosecution 
and a devolution of responsibility to the party who has the most 
information. Accordingly, “When the patentee has chosen to narrow a 
claim, courts may presume the amended text was composed with 
awareness of this rule and that the territory surrendered is not an 
equivalent of the territory claimed.”98 Essentially, the presumption 
asks why the patentee did not literally claim what he is now asserting 
is an equivalent. As the Court wrote, “The patentee must show that at 
the time of the amendment one skilled in the art could not reasonably 
be expected to have drafted a claim that would have literally 
encompassed the alleged equivalent.”99 
One can ask, therefore, why the Supreme Court has adopted 
the fiction of presumption that has resulted in a significant constraint 
on patent scope. What normative values are served? Enhanced 
certainty is perhaps the most obvious value at play, and, 
concomitantly, a reduction in litigation and judicial resources as 
predictability takes hold. By imposing certainty, the presumption 
mitigates some of the more challenging aspects presented by the 
bluntness of language,100 in particular, in discerning claim scope. An 
aggressive application of the DOE, as was present in Graver Tank, 
leads to migratory boundaries. The Festo presumption attempts to 
temporally freeze claim boundaries by making the DOE inapplicable 
 
 96.  The Court identified two other ways to rebut the presumption: (1) the rationale 
underlying the amendment was tangentially related to the equivalent; and (2) some other reason 
suggesting that the patentee could not reasonably be expected to have described the 
insubstantial substitute in question. Festo, 535 U.S. at 740–41. 
 97.  Id. at 741. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. Rebuttal has proven to be quite difficult since Festo was decided; perhaps the Festo 
presumption is a complete bar by another name. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The 
(Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REV. 955, 966 (2007) (“[P]atentees 
won only 24% of the doctrine of equivalents cases decided in the last eight years. Compared to 
the overall patentee win rates on other issues—54% on validity alone in cases at various stages 
of litigation, and 58% overall in cases that make it to trial . . . .”). 
 100.  This use of fiction is consistent with how fictions were used historically. As Nancy 
Knauer writes, “Some of the boldest legal fictions were adopted centuries ago by the English 
courts to mitigate the relentless formalism of the ancient writs . . . .” Nancy J. Knauer, Legal 
Fictions and Juristic Truth, 23 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1, 2 (2010).  
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to foreseeable equivalents, based on a devolution of responsibility 
theory that holds the inventor should have originally claimed them. 
A closer look at foreseeability sheds light on the normative 
values underlying the fiction. The principal policy underlying the 
DOE’s application to after-arising technologies is grounded in 
unforeseeability. As Judge Rader wrote, “A primary justification for 
the [DOE] is to accommodate after-arising technology. Without the 
[DOE], any claim drafted in current technological terms could be 
easily circumvented after the advent of an advance in technology.”101 
But why isn’t foreseeability a limitation on the DOE in the 
absence of a narrowing amendment?102 Why make a narrowing 
amendment a condition precedent for application of the Festo 
presumption? Claim drafting, or the capturing of extant and 
foreseeable technology, does not become easier in the wake of a 
narrowing amendment. Here too then resides another fiction, an 
artificial yet easily discernable event that acts as a dividing line 
between ex ante and ex post considerations. In other words, the 
bluntness of language cuts both ways; it is not only challenging for a 
competitor to glean claim scope, but also for an inventor seeking to 
fully secure his innovation armed only with written words. Justice 
Jackson reflected this consideration in Graver, noting the DOE is 
designed to protect the inventor from being “at the mercy of 
verbalism,”103 and Justice Kennedy wrote in Festo, “[L]anguage in the 
patent claims may not capture every nuance of the invention or 
 
 101.  Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 619 (Fed. Cir. 
2000) (Rader, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also SmithKline Beecham Corp. 
v. Excel Pharm., Inc., 356 F.3d 1357, 1363–64 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (stating that after-arising 
technology is the “quintessential example of an enforceable equivalent,” and noting further, 
“[u]sually, if the alleged equivalent represents later-developed technology (e.g., transistors in 
relation to vacuum tubes, or Velcro® in relation to fasteners) or technology that was not known in 
the relevant art, then it would not have been foreseeable. In contrast, old technology, while not 
always foreseeable, would more likely have been foreseeable”). This helps explain why 
equivalents is measured at the time of infringement (not filing), which reflects the cumulative 
and unforeseeable nature of complex and ramified technologies. Timothy Holbrook offers two 
justifications as to “why the patentee is entitled to protection under the doctrine of equivalents 
for a device that she never invented.” First, he asserts it is fair to permit a patentee to capture 
after-arising technology “when a change outside of the patentee’s field affects that field and her 
invention in a way that allows others to capture the essence of the invention by making trivial 
changes.” Second, Holbrook argues that an after-arising alleged equivalent may be captured 
under the DOE if the patentee’s “disclosure enables the asserted equivalent at the time of 
infringement.” This theory, notes Holbrook, “ties the availability of equivalents to the disclosure 
of the patent document, but allows those teachings to grow over time.” Timothy R. Holbrook, 
Equivalency and Patent Law’s Possession Paradox, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 36-37 (2009). 
102 See discussion of Ring & Pinion, supra note 95, on the availability of the DOE in the 
absence of a narrowing amendment. 
 103.  Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950). 
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describe with complete precision the range of its novelty.”104 Both 
Justices recognized that language is a blunt instrument, and excessive 
literalism would devalue the patent.105 How then to rein in the DOE, 
yet be sufficiently attentive to linguistic shortcomings? The Festo 
presumption triggered by a narrowing amendment is a response to 
this difficult question. 
The Festo Court candidly acknowledged this ex ante/ex post 
balance and the role of language: 
The [patent] . . . is a property right; and like any property right, its boundaries should 
be clear. This clarity is essential to promote progress, because it enables efficient 
investment in innovation. A patent holder should know what he owns, and the public 
should know what he does not. [There is a] delicate balance the law attempts to 
maintain between inventors, who rely on the promise of the law to bring the invention 
forth, and the public, which should be encouraged to pursue innovations, creations, and 
new ideas beyond the inventor’s exclusive rights.  
 It is true that the doctrine of equivalents renders the scope of patents less certain. If 
competitors cannot be certain about a patent’s extent, they may be deterred from 
engaging in legitimate manufactures outside its limits, or they may invest by mistake in 
competing products that the patent secures. These concerns with the doctrine of 
equivalents, however, are not new. Each time the Court has considered the doctrine, it 
has acknowledged this uncertainty as the price of ensuring the appropriate incentives 
for innovation, and it has affirmed the doctrine over dissents that urged a more certain 
rule.106 
CONCLUSION 
In numerous areas of law, judges have historically employed 
legal fictions to engage in cautious experimentation. Patent law is no 
 
 104.  Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002). 
 105.  Recall Justice Jackson’s admonition that without the DOE a patent would be “hollow 
and useless thing,” Graver, 339 U.S. at 607, and Justice Kennedy’s opinion, “If patents were 
always interpreted by their literal terms, their value would be greatly diminished. Unimportant 
and insubstantial substitutes for certain elements could defeat the patent, and its value to 
inventors could be destroyed by simple acts of copying,” Festo, 535 U.S. at 731. In short, it is 
exceedingly difficult to know of and linguistically capture extant technologies, let alone those 
that are foreseeable. 
 106.  Festo, 535 U.S. at 730–32. Although in the context of the definiteness requirement, the 
Supreme Court in Nautilus struck the same theme: 
On the one hand, the definiteness requirement must take into account 
the inherent limitations of language. Some modicum of uncertainty, the Court has 
recognized, is the “price of ensuring the appropriate incentives for innovation.” . . . At 
the same time, a patent must be precise enough to afford clear notice of what is 
claimed, thereby “ ‘appris[ing] the public of what is still open to them.’ ” Otherwise 
there would be “[a] zone of uncertainty which enterprise and experimentation may 
enter only at the risk of infringement claims.” And absent a meaningful definiteness 
check, we are told, patent applicants face powerful incentives to inject ambiguity into 
their claims. Eliminating that temptation is in order, and “the patent drafter is in the 
best position to resolve the ambiguity in . . . patent claims.” 
Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2128–29 (2014) (alterations in 
original) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).  
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exception; fictions are used to further normative preferences relating 
to administrability, certainty, claim scope, and other important policy 
aims. Properly cabined, the legal fiction allows for judicial flexibility to 
address a problem in the law that is preferable in large part to a 
legislative response that can have disruptive effects or result in 
legislation that reflects a distortive interestgroup dynamic. 
 
